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ISSUE NO. I 
Appellee's Version of the Facts on Appeal Reconstructs 
a Scenario Rejected by the Only Trier of Fact And, on Appeal 
from Summary Judgment, is Contrary to Utah Law. 
In reviewing the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant is first impressed that 
the function of a reply brief shall be limited to answering "any new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief. Rule 24(c) Utah R. App. P. In reviewing the brief of Appellee, Appellant 
is struck with the clear concept that the case appealed from, as recited by Appellee, is wholly 
different from that statement of facts set forth by Appellant. Appellee's factual statement 
propounds that on the day following her son's suicide, being advised of the existence of 
decedent's contemporaneous writings directed to Appellee, Appellee made no inquiry 
regarding their contents for over five days. Appellee cannot explain why, with no knowledge 
of the cremation note's contents, she, nonetheless, immediately consulted a mortician 
specifically about avoiding cremation within one day of her son's death. Appellee also 
immediately prohibited her family from discussing the cremation note' s contents or revealing 
the note to Appellant. Appellee goes to great lengths blaming Appellant for the apparent 
estrangement between Appellee and the decedent. Certainly, Appellee has no responsibility 
in this regard. Appellee then states that only following decedent's funeral in New Mexico 
did she first review his written notes, and then rushed over to Appellant to reveal the 
cremation note's full contents. Appellee then asserts, that with full knowledge of the note's 
contents, Appellant consented to the burial of her husband in St. George, Utah. Thereafter, 
in defending her continuing inequitable behavior during the proceedings below, Appellee 
argues that Appellant somehow mistakenly failed to appear at a "hearing" to be held on April 
15, 2003 and that those rules of civil procedure, together with the rules of judicial 
administration, applicable to motions and orders are apparently advisory in nature and do not 
mandate compliance regardless of their clear language. 
Not wanting to be laborious in reply, Appellant is constrained, nonetheless, to reiterate 
that point set forth as Issue IV in her original brief. Simply stated, on review of a summary 
judgment, the party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the 
facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most 
favorable to her. See, e.g., Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); English v. 
Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App 1989). In the instant case, the only Judge to have 
heard the testimony of Appellee, recited on appeal by Appellee to support her position, 
discounted Appellee's credibility. Clearly, Judge Shumate, having heard both the testimony 
of Appellant and Appellee concluded that only after the decedent's burial in St. George did 
Appellant become aware of her husband's written directive to be cremated. (R397). This 
comports with the Appellant's statement of facts which are the only facts which the Court 
of Appeals can legitimately consider. IHC Health Servs. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt, Inc. ,73 P.3d 
320, 323 (Utah 2003). As a result, Appellant must assert that Appellee's facts are a 
euphemistic reconstruction of a scenario wholly rejected by the only trier of fact in the instant 
case. Indeed, Appellee's version of the facts should be wholly crossed out or simply re-
spelled as FAXX. 
7. 
Judge Beacham, subsequently assigned to the case, concluded that under any 
circumstances the mere burial of the decedent comprised a waiver on Appellant's part of her 
primary right to dispose of her husband's body. This resolution, however, does not take into 
account the fact that the burial occurred under circumstances wherein Appellee willfully 
concealed the decedent's written request from Appellant despite the latter's inquiry. This 
statement of fact was clearly before Judge Beacham. Oxymoronically, however, Judge 
Beacham clearly states in his summary judgment that in finding for Appellee he accepted 
Appellee's version of facts set forth in Appellee's supporting memorandum. (R862). This, 
again, is directly inapposite to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant's version of the facts, for purposes of the summary judgment, can be found 
at R810-13, R822-24, and R852-56. At the District Court, Appellant stated that though the 
decedent had phoned her on February 12, 2002 orally expressing a desire to be cremated, 
decedent had also phoned her back one-half hour later stating that he did not mean what he 
had said. Appellant also asserted that Appellee, anxious that Appellant would feel bound by 
the note and cremate her husband, allowed Appellant only to see a portion of the note with 
Appellant not seeing the entire note until the summer of 2002. (R811). Appellant thereafter 
clearly sets forth that by previously attending the funeral service in Utah she did not affirm 
decedent's burial because she was not aware of Curtis' wish to be cremated at this point and 
would not have allowed the burial had she known of her deceased husband's directive. 
(R812, 824). Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is attached as Exhibit " 1 " of the Reply Brief Addendum, the first four pages of 
which comprise a portion of Appellant's factual statements. Exhibit "2" of the Reply Brief 
Addendum shall comprise that factual Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, timely filed on 
August 4, 2003, contemporaneous with her Memorandum in opposition to Summary 
Judgment. Furthermore, Appellant's final Reply Brief in the lower court is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "3" to the Reply Brief Addendum. 
In conclusion, Appellant asserts that the factual scenario relied on by Appellee to seek 
affirmation of the lower Court's judgment should be wholly rejected as a matter of law by 
the Court of Appeals. Similarly, Judge Beacham's acceptance of Appellee's version of facts 
in finding in Appellee's favor is contrary to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUE NO, II 
Appellee's Reconstruction of the Events of April 15, 2003 
is Both ill-conceived and Tenwous. 
In Appellee's first issue before the Court, Appellee blames Appellant as contributing 
to Appellee and her counsel's confusion surrounding the proceedings of April 15, 2003. 
Appellee indicates Appellant provided no explanation as to why Appellant "thought the April 
15, 2003 hearing was cancelled". (Appellee's Brief at 17). Appellant's explanation, 
however, is implicit within the context of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellee's 
Motion to Recuse, filed at 4:55 p.m. on April 14, 2003 ostensibly cancelled the April 15, 
2003 hearing. Rule 63(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that "[t]he judge 
against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further hearing, enter an 
order granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge ." Id 
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(emphasis added). 
The transcript of the April 15,2003 hearing clearly states that Appellee arrived alone 
with her counsel. Appellee's counsel then advised the Judge of Appellee's Motion to 
Recuse. Thereafter, seeking to take advantage of Appellant's counsel's understanding that 
procedurally no hearing could occur, Appellee withdrew her Motion to Recuse and 
proceeded with an orally propounded Motion to Dismiss. Appellee then attempts to 
distinguish her actions from those undertaken in Stebbins v. White, 235 Cal. Rptr. 656, (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987) by concluding that by withdrawing her Motion to Recuse, she did not 
"repudiate her recusal motion". (Appellee's Brief at 18). Indeed, Appellee's tenuous logic 
would suggest that withdrawal of a motion by a party is not akin to repudiation of that 
motion. Appellee's five lines in reply attempting to distinguish Stebbins are succinctly set 
forth as follows: 
Stebbins is dramatically different than the case at hand. First, Petitioner has 
never tried to repudiate her recusal request. The request was withdrawn and 
after the confused hearing of April 15,2003, Petitioner filed as an order what 
was thought to represent the intent of the ruling of the court. Petitioner clearly 
has never attempted to repudiate her recusal motion. 
Clearly, the Court of Appeals should not entertain Appellee's casuistic semantics in 
contrasting "withdraw" and "repudiate." This course ultimately provides more misdirection 
and confusion than clarity in the law. See, e.g., Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836-37 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (discussing the synonymous meaning of the words "prevailing" and 
"successful" in reversing a lower court). Appellee's withdrawal of her motion to recuse is 
not only akin to repudiating it, but withdrawal is exactly the same procedure that occurred 
in Stebbins. 
Within minutes after the hearing on April 15, 2003, it cannot be gainsaid that 
Appellant's counsel discussed the hearing with Appellee's counsel and specifically requested 
that a copy of the proposed Order of Dismissal be submitted for counsel's review. (Rl 90-92; 
140-44). Appellee and her counsel, directly contrary to the then applicable Utah Rules of 
Administrative Procedure, submitted an order which Judge Shumate properly found was 
erroneous. (R3 99). This erroneous order was intentionally propounded in memorialized form 
to Judge Shumate absent its prior submission to Appellant's counsel. 
Appellee, without recitation of her and her counsel's inequitable behavior, then 
recites, "Judge Shumate properly exercised judicial discretion when he ruled that orders 
granting permanent injunction were invalid and recused himself from the proceedings". 
(Appellant's Brief at 19). The difficulty with this statement, however, is that there were not 
plural orders granting permanent injunction, only that single erroneous order willfully 
prepared by Appellee and her counsel contrary to the proceedings they engaged in on April 
15,2003. Furthermore, when Judge Shumate granted Appellee's Motion to Recuse in May 
of 2003, that Motion had already been withdrawn one month earlier and less than one day 
after it had been filed. (Rl 15; Tl 197 at 3-4). Judge Shumate ultimately should have entered 
an order conforming to the dismissal so earnestly sought b> Appellee on April 15,2003. As 
earlier set forth, Judge Shumate had retained authority to enter this order. (See Issue I, 
Appellant's Brief). Ultimately, relief from one's own counsel's legal negligence shouldnever 
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be obtained by sua sponte judicial intervention. Indeed, Utah Courts have consistently held 
that relief "will not be granted based on the incompetence or negligence of one's own trial 
counsel". Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1982). Ultimately, as this Court has 
clearly determined, "in the civil context, a malpractice action, not a new trial, is frequently 
suggested as the appropriate remedy for the client whose counsel's performance falls below 
the standard of professional competence". Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888, 
894 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
Appellant further asserts that, beyond those actions undertaken by Appellee and her 
counsel at the April 15, 2003 hearing, Appellee's submission of an erroneous order absent 
prior review requested by Appellant was not mere incompetence, but was a willful act 
undertaken as a purposeful manipulation of the courts of Utah. Judge Shumate clearly noted 
that Appellee's new counsel's appearance on April 11, 2003 resulted in the case being 
handled in a clumsy manner with "a general failure to comply with the rules of civil 
procedure and the rules of judicial administration". (R398-99). Thereafter, Judge Shumate 
clearly notes that having failed to comply with the rule, Appellee and her counsel further 
propounded an order for the trial court's signature which was erroneous as a matter of law. 
Appellant has clearly set forth in her initial brief that Judge Shumate's ruling indicating that 
he had been divested of all jurisdiction by Appellee's mere filing of the motion to recuse on 
April 14, 2003, is incorrect as a matter of law. Judge Shumate states clearly at R399 that 
Petitioner [Appellee] withdrew the Rule 63 motion. Thereafter, the trial court retained 
jurisdiction to make rulings in the instant case which are not void per se and which compel 
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dismissal of Appellee's case. 
ISSUE NO. Ill 
Appellee's Inequitable Actions in this Matter Preclude 
her from Obtaining Equitable Relief. 
Appellee concedes in her brief that if she were guilty of bad acts she would be barred 
from relief. (Appellee's Brief at 25.) Nevertheless, Appellee appears blind to the obvious 
truth that her actions in this matter concerning her son's wishes to be cremated and her 
deliberate withholding of this information from Appellant were far short of equitable. 
Appellee contends that choosing to bury her son does not automatically define Appellee as 
having unclean hands. Appellee, however, defied clear directives in the suicide note from 
her son regarding the disposition of his remains by cremation and decided that her personal 
disdain for cremation and the location her son selected for the spreading of the ashes was 
paramount to her son's preference. 
Appellee's actions in this respect flies in the face of common respect for the wishes 
of a decedent, who must rely on the integrity of those to whom directives are issued, as well 
as the law, which generally provides that the wishes of a decedent regarding the disposition 
of his remains should be followed. See In re the Estate of Mover. 577 P.2d 108,110 (Utah 
1978); Cordts v. Cordts. 118 P.2d 556, 558 (Kan. 1941); Tkaczvk v. Gallagher. 222 A.2d 
226, 228 (Conn. 1965); Guerin v. Cassidv. 119 A.2d 780, 782 (NJ. 1955). The Supreme 
Court of this State clearly set forth that a person should be able to choose the manner in 
which his body is disposed and the choice should be held to be binding after death as long 
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as it is done within the limits of reason and decency related to the accepted customs of 
mankind. In re Estate of Mover, 577 P.2d at 110. In this case, Appellee denied the request 
of Appellant's husband for cremation, which is a disposition that is clearly reasonable and 
decent according to custom. Mr. Hughes unfortunately misplaced his testamentary directives 
with an individual who considered her own desires higher than those of her deceased son. 
Appellee herself has admitted that she did not consider the wishes of Appellant's husband 
regarding the disposition of body significant and that she did not think once about following 
his directions regarding the disposition of his remains. (T1200 at 58, 60:24-61:2; Tl 195 at 
26:1-2; 40:4-6). While Appellee's decision to bury her son's remains, contrary to clear 
instructions otherwise, may be justified in her own mind, her behavior in this respect was 
reproachful and certainly out of joint with principles of equity. 
Appellee further carried through with her plan to bury the remains of Appellant's 
husband contrary to his wishes by keeping the suicide note and its contents concealed from 
Appellant. Appellee argues sternly that she was under no obligations to show the suicide 
note to Appellant. (Appellee's Brief at 26.) However, under the common law and the law 
as now codified in Utah, Appellant would have had the first exclusive right and duty to 
determine the manner in which her husband's remains were disposed. See Utah Code Ann. 
§58-9-602 (2002); Hackett v. Hackett 26 A. 42, 43-44 (R.I. 1893); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew. 
56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904); Novelli v. Carroll 420 A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. Super. 1980). In fact, 
Appellee herself admits that "In the case at hand, Respondent [Appellant] had a right as 
Curtis's spouse to determine the disposition of his body." (Appellee's Brief at 29). As the 
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decedent's wife, Appellant had not only a right based on the marital relationship to know of 
her husband's wishes concerning the disposition of his remains, but had a legal right to make 
a determination in that regard, which determination was taken away by Appellee's refusal 
to inform Appellant of the true desires of Appellant's husband. 
Appellee would have this Court believe that she did not know the note's contents until 
after the funeral service in New Mexico. (Appellee's Brief at 26.) This representation of 
events, however, contrasts with the established facts that even before the New Mexico 
funeral, Appellee had discussed avoiding cremation with a mortician and had prohibited 
family from discussing the content's of the note with Appellant. Moreover, Appellee 
specifically informed Appellant that the note did not contain a cremation request and that the 
only content of the note concerning Appellant was a declaration of love. (T1200 at 48-51, 
53, 55, 57, 58.) It is simply illogical to assume, and contrary the facts of the case, that 
Appellee did not read the suicide note until March 6,2002 when she had obtained possession 
of the note as early as February 28, 2002. 
Moreover, after the New Mexico funeral, Appellee allowed Appellant only to see a 
portion of the note with Appellant not seeing the contents of the entire document. (R811). 
Appellant did see the full letter or learn of its full contents until late in the summer of 2002 
during the course of proceedings related to her husband's insurance policy. (T1200 at 62:18-
23; 67:14-24). Appellee's claim that she showed Appellant the note and all its contents after 
the New Mexico funeral is untrue and contrary to the findings of the only trier of fact to have 
heard both parties' testimony. After hearing the testimony of both Appellant and Appellee 
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during the course of the two day trial in this matter, Judge Shumate, the only Judge to have 
actually heard testimony of the parties, found that Appellant became aware of her husband's 
desire to be cremated only after the burial in St. George, Utah. (R397). Had Appellant 
known of the note's instructions prior to burial, Appellant would have had the remains of her 
husband cremated before the burial was effectuated. (T1200 at 114:3-15). Appellant, 
however, was deprived of this information due to Appellee's surreptitious behavior. 
In regards to the procedural inequities, Appellee acknowledges that her former 
counsel had played "legal hardball" but attempts to draw attention from this finding by 
suggesting that it was a confused proceeding where incorrect orders were signed. 
(Appellee's Brief at 26-27.) Appellee overlooks that the proceeding was confused only 
because of her counsel's last minute recusal motion and that incorrect orders were signed 
only because her counsel had submitted an erroneous order to the Court that did not conform 
to the Court's orders, without having first sent the same to Appellant's counsel for review 
despite counsel's prior request. Moreover, the proceedings were further confused with 
Appellee's counsel appearing at Court on April 15,2004, despite her own motion to recuse, 
and by her attempt to take unfair advantage of Appellant during the proceeding by orally 
withdrawing her motion to recuse and then motioning the court for other orders. 
The actions of Appellee both before she initiated this litigation and during the 
pendency of this matter have been far from equitable, and have directly effected the course 
of events in this matter to Appellant's detriment. As equity is reserved to those who have 
acted equitably and denied to those who have not, Appellee is certainly not entitled to 
11 
equitable relief in the form of the permanent injunction issued by the lower court. 
ISSUE NO. IV 
Appellant did not Waive Her Right to the Disposition of Her 
Husband's Remains as Appellant was Unaware of 
His Cremation Instructions Prior to Burial. 
Appellee forwards the argument that somehow it may be inferred from the 
circumstances of this case that Appellant intentionally relinquished her right to determine the 
disposition of her husband's remains. It has been specifically set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct. Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. 
&Loan, 857 P.2d 935,940 (Utah 1993). Waiver should not be found from any particular set 
of facts unless it was clearly intended. IcL A fact finder must determine based on the totality 
of the circumstances whether the relinquishment is clearly intended. Id. at 941. Moreover, 
the general principal in case law is that "[m]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is some 
duty or obligation to speak." Id. at 940 (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v. Div. of State Lands 
& Forestry, 802 P.2d 720,730 (Utah 1990)). Clearly Appellant did not manifest the requisite 
intent indicating a waiver of her right to determine the ultimate disposition of her husband's 
remains. Appellee suggests that because Appellant participated in the funeral services that 
this implies a waiver. The newly assigned judge similarly concluded the burial of the 
remains itself constituted a waiver on behalf of Appellant. Appellant's silence in relation to 
the cremation, however, is directly tied to Appellee's active concealment of Mr. Hughes' 
specific requests in relation thereto. Judge Shumate earlier made a determination after 
hearing the testimony of both Appellant and Appellee that Appellant did not learn of her 
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husband's instructions to cremate his remains until after the burial had taken place. (R397). 
Appellant, in actuality, did not learn of the cremation request until late in the summer of 
2002. (T1200 at 62:18-23; 67:14-24). Were it not for the fact that Mr. Hughes' cremation 
request had been withheld from her, Appellant would have had the remains of her husband 
cremated before the burial services took place. (T1200 at 114:3-15). 
The issue of waiver is a fact intensive issue and summary judgement on waiver should 
be reserved for circumstances where there are clearly no disputed issues of material fact. 
IHC Health Servs. Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. Inc.73 P.3d 320, 323 (Utah 2003). On the 
Appellate level, as on the trial level, this Court should view facts in a light most favorable 
to a party losing on summary judgment and give no deference to the lower court's 
conclusions of law. Bearden v. Croft. 31 P.3d 537, 538 (Utah 2001). Specifically, it has 
been held that "[i]n a waiver case determined on summary judgment, we must first inquire 
whether there are disputed material facts. If there are no disputed material facts, we consider 
all the undisputed material facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." IHC 
Health Servs. Inc., 73 P.3d at 323. As this Court must consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to Appellant, any factual scenario represented by Appellee that is out of joint with 
Appellant's factual statements and findings of the lower court, must be rejected. The facts 
of the case demonstrate that Appellee knew of Mr. Hughes' desire to be cremated and 
blatantly withheld such information from Appellant. Certainly it is not possible to determine 
that Appellant was aware of a right to cremate her husband and intentionally waived that 
right considering such vital information was hidden from her by Appellee. 
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Appellee argues that In re Estate of Mover. 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978) and Paskeret 
al. v. Morse. 887 P.2d 872 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) support an inference that Appellee waived 
the right to chose cremation. However, both of these cases are factually distinguishable to 
the present matter in important respects and therefore do not apply. First, in Mover, the 
decedent's wishes for cremation were communicated by will to the executor who had the 
"right and a duty" to carry out the will. Id at 110. The execulor failed to act and permitted 
the mother and family of the decedent to carry out the burial. Id. The obvious and crucial 
difference between Mover and the case at hand is that in Mover the person with the foremost 
right to determine the disposition of the decedent did not ad on that right. In the present 
matter, to the contrary the person with the foremost right to determine the disposition of the 
decedent, after the decedent himself, i.e. the Appellant, was denied knowledge regarding the 
decedent's instructions. Absent such knowledge regarding the wishes of her husband, 
Appellant was not in a position to exercise that right and carry out his directives. The body 
in Mover was buried without objection even though the party entitled to make the objection 
was fully aware of the decedent's wishes. Such was not the case in the matter at hand where 
Appellant was wholly unaware of her husband's wishes to be cremated. 
In Pasker, the Defendant Morse had entered into a contract with Holland-Pasker & 
Associates concerning the design and construction of an office building. Pasker et al. v. 
Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 873-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The project had four distinct phases. 
IcL After completion of the first phase, the schematic design phase, the contract dictated that 
Holland-Pasker would not proceed to the following phase unless payment for the first phase 
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was received. Id. at 874. Regardless of this contractual agreement, upon completion of the 
schematic design phase Morse, who had been working side by side with Holland-Pasker and 
visited the latter's office an average of three times per week, requested that Holland-Pasker 
"proceed immediately to the design development phase" of the contract although no payment 
on the first phase had been made. Id at 876. Pasker-Holland accordingly proceeded to the 
second phase of the project. Id. At trial Pasker-Holland claimed, and successfully argued 
to the trial court, that Morse was liable for the work performed on both phases of the project. 
Id. Morse asserted a defense that the contract restricted Pasker-Holland from proceeding to 
the second phase without having received compensation for the first phase. Id. at 876-77. 
In deciding in favor of Pasker-Holland on appeal, the Court stated that "[b]y asking Pasker 
to proceed with the design development phase, knowing full well he had not yet paid for the 
schematic phase work, Morse intentionally waived any benefit he had under the provision." 
Id. at 877. Morse clearly knew what his rights were under the contract yet, nonetheless, 
verbally informed Pasker-Holland to proceed to the next phase anyhow. 
Clearly the case at hand is distinguishable where Appellant made no representation 
and expressed no intent whatsoever regarding the waiver of her rights with respect to 
disposition of Mr. Hughes' remains. The Court's inference of waiver in Pasker was clearly 
supported where the Defendant himself had verbally waived his contractual protections. No 
such indication of waiver on the part of Appellant exists in this case and the facts, especially 
when construed in favor of Appellant, in no way support such an attenuated inference. 
Appellee's analogies to Mover and Pasker and argument that the same support a finding of 
15 
waiver in this case should be rejected as mere attempts to misdirect the Court and confuse 
the issues. Under the law regarding waiver as established in Utah, it is simply not possible 
to make any factual inference that Appellant waived the right to determine the final 
disposition of her husband's remains. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks to exercise her right to disinter her deceased husband and finally 
dispose of his remains as he instructed. This matter would never have resulted in litigation 
had Appellee been forthright with Appellant from the start. Appellee, choosing to follow her 
own initiative and clearly rejecting the Plaintiff instructions of her son to be cremated, opted 
to engage in deceit and foul play in order to keep secret the decedent's final requests 
regarding the disposition of his remains. Appellee actively hid the truth from Appellant in 
order to carry out the burial. Had Appellant been informed of the contents of her husband's 
note and his final directions, Appellant, who was willing to honor such directions, would 
have carried them out as requested. 
Appellee submits to this Court a set of facts substantially inapposite to the evidence 
of the case and statement of facts set forth by Appellant. Notwithstanding Appellee's 
representation of the facts the Court is constrained on reviewing the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling to construe the facts in the light most favorable to Appellant. 
Appellant, as the decedent's spouse, has the foremost to determine the disposition of 
her husband's remains. This right continues, even though the remains have been wrongly 
interred contrary to his wishes. Appellant did not waive this right as her silence until after 
16 
the burial did not manifest a consent to a burial, but rather an ignorance of Mr. Hughes' 
directions. Appellant is entitled to carry out her late husband's wishes and should not be 
barred from so doing from the wrongfully issued injunction, which should be reversed by this 
Court. In addition, Appellant should be awarded her reasonable attorney's fees for defending 
against the wrongful injunction. 
DATED this / S d a y of November, 2004. 
HUGHES AND BURSELL 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
I, Michael D. Hughes, certify that on November _, 2004,1 served two copies of the 
attached Reply Brief of Appellant upon Kathleen McConkie, the counsel for the Appellee in this 
matter, by mailing the same, via first class mail, postage prepaid, at the following address: 
Kathleen McConkie 
150 North Main Street 
Suite 202 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Michael D. Hughes 
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OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No 020502154 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
COMES NOW, Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, by and through her attorneys of record Michael D 
Hughes and William O Kimball, of Hughes and Bursell, P C , hereby file this Memorandum in 
Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum 
m Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMORANDUM 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Respondent disputes paragraph #3 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because 
Petitioner is stating a partial truth. Curtis did leave a voice mail message on February 12,2002, but 
then called back !4 hour later and stated that he did not mean what he said. Furthermore, the 
Respondent thought that it was a ploy to get attention, as is common in her profession. (Deposition 
ofLeslieDozzo-Hughesp.143, lines 8-15). 
2. Respondent disputes #5 ofPetitioner's Statement ofFacts because although she made 
the arrangements, Petitioner's family constantly pushed the Respondent and Cory Hughes was 
waiting at French's Mortuary and tried to intimidate the Respondent into releasing Curtis' s body for 
burial in Utah. Furthermore, Respondent did not release possession and control of the body to 
Petitioner. Petitioner allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take the body to Utah, but she did not release the 
body to Petitioner in any manner, contrary to Petitioner's baseless assertions. (Affidavit of Leslie 
Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 2). 
3. Respondent disputes paragraph #7 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because 
Petitioner was very nervous that the Respondent would want to cremate Curtis. This fear was 
stimulated by the Petitioner's knowledge of the contents of the note. (See hearing transcript for 
December 16-17). 
4. Respondent disputes paragraph #8 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because 
Petitioner only showed the Respondent part of the note. Respondent was not allowed to see the 
of 2002. and thus, did not know the wishes of her deceased 
husband until after the burial. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 4; Judge Shumate's 
May 19, 2003 Ruling). 
5. Respondent disputes paragraph #9 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts regarding the 
connotation that Respondent waived her rights to the body of her deceased husband. Respondent 
allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take her husband to Utah and bury him. Petitioner may have paid the 
mortuary, but the Respondent never relinquished control of her husband to Petitioner. (Affidavit of 
Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 5). 
6. Respondent refutes paragraph#l 0 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts. Respondent did 
not affirm the burial by attending the funeral service. Respondent was not aware of Curtis' wish to 
be cremated at this point and in no way affirmed the burial, particularly absent the knowledge of her 
deceased husband's directive. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 6; Judge Shumate's 
May 19, 2003 Ruling). 
7. Respondent refutes paragraph #11 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts as not applicable 
to the present case. The stone and bench placed upon the grave was not placed on the grave until 
after the December 16 and 17 hearing. Furthermore, to hurt the Respondent, Petitioner 
conspicuously left Respondent's name off the memorial portion of the bench. (Affidavit of Leslie 
Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 7). 
8. Respondent refutes paragraph #12 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts as far as no 
actual proof exists relating to this paragraph. Petitioner stated at her deposition that she did not own 
the land that Curtis was buried on. (Deanna Pugh Deposition p. 30, lines 2-9). 
unsubstantiated by the Affidavit of Deanna Pugh. Deanna Pugh cannot testify regarding the 
knowledge of the other family members. Furthermore, had Curtis' family not lied to the Respondent, 
she would not need to pursue the present action to honor her deceased husband's wishes. 
10. Respondent refutes paragraph#14 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts by referring this 
Court to Judge Shumate's Ruling dated May 19, 2003, which states "[s]ometime following the 
burial, Respondent became aware of Mr. Hughes' desire to be cremated and have his ashes scattered 
from abridge spanning the Rio Grande River." Judge Shumate's May 19, 2003 Ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH LAW ENABLES THE RESPONDENT TO HONOR HER DECEASED 
HUSBAND'S BURIAL WISH 
Petitioner weakly argues that the language of U.C.A. § 58-9-602 "does not provide for 
'disinterment,' but merely for disposition for a deceased person upon death which includes the 
location and condition of the disposition." Again, the plain meaning of the statute cannot be any 
clearer. Utah Code Annotated § 58-9-602 provides the following: 
The right and duty to control the disposition of a deceased person, 
including the location and conditions of the disposition, vest in the 
following degrees of relationship in the order named: 
(1) a person designated in a written 
instrument, excluding a power of attorney that 
terminates at death under Sections 75-5-501 
and 75-5-502 . . . 
(2) the surviving, legally recognized spouse of 
the decedent 
4.-u^ on-r^nno- ph-Ufi
 o r tke majority of the 
surviving children of the decedent over the 
age of 18; 
(4) the unanimous consent of the surviving 
parent, parents, or lawful custodian of the 
decedent. 
The plain meaning of the applicable part of the Utah statute is that the surviving spouse has "[t]he 
right and duty to control disposition, including the location and conditions of the disposition." The 
statute sets out that the surviving spouse has control over not only the burial arrangements, but also 
"the location and conditions of the disposition." The statute does not say that Respondent waives 
her right to the disposition
 (of the body once it is placed in the ground. The statute clearly gives 
plenary power to the Respondent, Leslie Dozzo, who is Curtis Hughes' legal spouse. Utah case law 
has extensively determined that "[w]hen interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince 'the true 
intent and purpose of the Legislature.'" Utah v. Tooele County, 44 P.3d 680 (citing Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). The plain language of the statute 
provides us with the road map to the statute's meaning, helping to clarify the intent and purpose 
behind its enactment. Id. (citations omitted). When reading the statutory language, our purpose is 
'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful," id. (emphasis added)(a"fr'ng Millett v. 
Clark County Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)), and thus, we 'presume the legislature use[d] 
each term advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary meaning." Id. (citing Nelson v. Salt Lake 
County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). As a result, we 'avoid interpretations that will render a 
statute superfluous or inoperative." Id. (citing Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr., 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 
O A A 1 \ T f T T n A r O A /TA1 _x : _ : „ x x_ J x _ M IJ. x 1 _ _ T ^ _ _ _ J _ _ x ^ 
husband, it would render the statute "inoperative" as to all activities subsequent to burial. Again, 
the statute gives the power to control "the location and conditions of the disposition," not only the 
initial burial process. 
n
- THE SMART V. MOYER CASE DOES NOT BAR DISINTERMENT 
Petitioner continues to misdirect this Court to the case of Smart v. Mover. 577 P.2d 108 
(Utah 1978). The Smart case is distinguishable from the present facts. First, in the Smart case, the 
executor of the will at the time of burial was aware of the decedent's contrary directives for disposal. 
In fact, the executor had the will in his possession and failed to timely object to the burial of the 
decedent. Second, the executor of the will was not legally related to the decedent and only had 
authority through the will. Conversely, in this case, the Respondent was not made aware of her 
spouse's written directives until "[sjometime following the burial, Respondent became aware of Mr. 
Hughes' desire to be cremated and have his ashes scattered from a bridge spanning the Rio Grande 
River." Judge Shumate made this factual finding after receiving testimony from both parties over 
a two day period on December 16th and 17th 2002. Thus, Petitioner did not waive any right to honor 
the wishes of her deceased spouse unknown to her in March 2002. In addition, as she is the legal 
spouse of the decedent, pursuant to common law, she has sole discretion when it comes to the 
disposition of her husband's remains and disposition thereafter. Hackett v. Hackett, 26 A. 42 (RJ. 
1893V,Pettigrewv.Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904V, Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 105 
So. 161 (Ala. App. Ct. 1925); Teaslev v. Thompson, 165 S.W.2d 940 (Ark. 1942); Leschev v. 
Leschey, 97 A.2d 784 (Pa. 1953); Tkaczvk v. Gallagher, 222 A.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. of Conn., New 
m. U.C.A. § 58-9-601 ET. SEQ. SHOULD APPLY TO THE PRESENT CASE 
BECAUSE UTAH HAS NO OTHER APPLICABLE UTAH LAW. 
Ultimately, new legislation codified as U.C.A. § 58-9-602 should apply to the present case. 
There was no applicable law in Utah prior to U.C.A. § 58-9-602 to assist the Court in a 
determination in this case. Petitioner is asserting the U.C.A. § 58-9-602 should only apply 
prospectively and not retroactively. That is normally true where a new statute replaces old law. 
However, in this case, there is no old law. The Smart case simply does not apply and there is no 
other case law in Utah to assist this Court. 
TV. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT U.C.A. 58-9-601 ET. SEQ. DOES 
NOT APPLY TO THE PRESENT CASE, WE MUST TURN TO NEW 
MEXICO LAW THAT MIRRORS U.C.A. 58-9-601 ET. SEQ. 
In this case, New Mexico law should apply because both the decedent and Petitioner were 
domiciled in the New Mexico, the decedent died in New Mexico, the parties were married in New 
Mexico and the decedent was only shipped to Utah post mortem for burial. As this action has been 
initiated in the State of Utah, Utah choice of law rules clearly apply to determine whether New 
Mexico or Utah law should govern the present case. Utah Courts have long determined that "[S]ince 
Utah is the forum state, Utah's choice of law rules determine the outcome of the conflict." Shaw v. 
Lavton Constr. Co.. Inc., 872P.2d 1059, 1063 (UtahCt. App. 1994) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Elec. Mfg. Co.. 313 U.S. 487, 495-96, 85 L Ed. 1477, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941)). 
Utah has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Justice Wilkins, speaking 
for a unanimous Supreme Court inWaddoupsv Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054,1059 (Utah 
2002) stated that in order to ascertain which state's law is applicable in a given case, "[i]n Utah we 
apply the 'most significant relationship" approach as described in the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws in determining which state5 s laws should apply to a given circumstance. See Am. 
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Fanners Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186,190 (Utah 1996); see also Records v. Briegs. 
887 P.2d 864, 867-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that this court has adopted the 'most 
significant relationship' test over the previously used lex loci approach for torts and likely intended 
to apply the approach to other types of claims, and identifying federal cases that concluded we 
'would apply the 'most significant relationship' test in contract as well a tort matter"); cited in 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Suear Co., 54P.3d 1054,1059 (Utah 2002). In Waddoups, the case was 
determined to fall under the realm of a tort action and thus the applicable factors were considered 
to determine whether Utah or Idaho law applied. After determining that the actions took place in 
Idaho and most of the contact of the parties was in Idaho, the Supreme Court determined that "Idaho 
has the most significant relationship with the parties and their employment relationship, and we 
therefore apply the substantive law of Idaho." Waddoups at 1160. 
In order to ascertain what constitutes the "most significant relationship" we turn to the 
Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws § 6. Section 6 specifically provides that: 
§ 6 Choice-Of-Law Principles 
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will 
follow statutory directive of its own state on choice of 
law. 
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant 
to the choice of the applicable rule of law incude 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, * 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination 
of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of 
law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to 
be applied. 
In contract disputes, in order to ascertain the above elements, the Court normally looks to the place 
of contracting, the place of the negotiating of the contract, the place of performance, the location of 
the subj ect matter and the domicile of the parties. Morris v. Health Net of California, Inc., 988 P.2d 
940, 942 (Utah 1999). The facts of this particular case are not exactly a contract dispute, but it is 
helpful to consider similar factors. In this case, Curtis resided in New Mexico. Furthermore, Curtis 
passed away in New Mexico. Furthermore, Curtis and the Respondent were married in New Mexico. 
In addition, a New Mexico mortuary service prepared Curtis for burial and a service was held in New 
Mexico. Moreover, the Respondent is a resident of New Mexico and has exercised her rights as a 
resident of New Mexico since Curtis' passing. Therefore, it would stand to reason that New Mexico 
law would govern this particular case, if Utah and New Mexico law do not coincide. 
Petitioner will likely argue that Utah law should apply because Curtis was ultimately buried 
in Utah. However, Respondent, under the New Mexico statute was simply exercising her ability to 
determine where Curtis would be buried. The Respondent did not waive her right under the New 
Mexico statute once Curtis was buried in Utah. The Respondent5 s ability to govern the whereabouts 
of her deceased husband continues under the New Mexico Statute to this day. Thus, if necessary, 
the New Mexico statute should be applied in the present case to ur>ho1ri "Reqnnnrlpnt'c rinrVi+c 
regarding he deceased husband 
hi this case, there is no conflict between Utah law and New Mexico law. Under both statutes, 
the Respondent maintains control of her deceased husband and determines where and how he should 
rest. Petitioner has unduly tried to usurp this power. The Utah Supreme Court has determined that 
where no significant differences exist between Utah law and law of other states, "the court may 
properly apply Utah law in the absence of an affirmative showing that the law of [the other state] is 
different" cited in Jeff v. Stubbs, 970P.2d 1234, 1251 (Utah 1998). New Mexico law provides in 
relevant part the following: 
If a decedent has left no written instructions regarding the 
disposition of his remains [i.e. a document that conforms with the 
requirements of a will], the following persons in the order listed 
shall determine the means of disposition, not to be limited to 
cremation, of the remains of the decedent: 
(a) the surviving spouse; 
(b) a majority of the surviving parents of the decedent; 
©) the surviving parents of the decedent; 
(d) a majority of the surviving siblings of the decedent. 
New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 24-12A-2 
As the above statute provides, the Respondent has control over the "means of disposition." 
V. THE RESPONDENT HAS NOT DECLINED TO ACT ON HER RIGHT AND 
DUTY TO CONTROL THE DISPOSITION OF HER HUSBAND 
In addition, Petitioner argues that because she paid for the mortuary service in Utah that 
Respondent somehow waived her rights to determine the disposition and continuing disposition of 
her husband. In support of her position, Petitioner cites U.C.A. § 58-9-603. In part this section 
states that *'[i]f a person declines to act on the right and duty to control the disposition as established 
in this part, the right and duty to control the disposition pass . . . ." In no way did Respondent 
decline to act on her right and duty. Exercising her power under the New Mexico Statute, the 
Respondent allowed her husband to be buried in Utah. She did not voluntarily relinquish control of 
the disposition of her husband, she simply allowed him to buried in Utah. Simply crossing state lines 
and allowing the Petitioner to assist with funeral costs does not constitute a waiver. 
Furthermore, Respondent's actions do not constitute a waiver. Waiver is defined as "[t]he 
voluntary relinquishment or abandonment... of a legal right or advantage . . . . " BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1574 (7th 1999). Respondent has never stated or indicated in any way that she has 
committed a waiver in the present case. Moreover, Respondent's actions do not constitute a waiver. 
Allowing Petitioner to assist in paying for the burial and transportation does not mean Respondent 
has waived her rights to her husband's body. Respondent has not relinquished or abandoned her 
legal right to designate where he husband's body resides. 
CONCLUSION 
Under U.C.A. § 58-9-602 the Respondent has complete control over the her husbands 
remains. In addition, the Smart v. Mover case is not applicable to the present facts and need not be 
examined by this Court. Moreover, U.C.A. § 58-9-602 is the only applicable law in Utah and does 
not overtake any other Utah law that would govern the present case. If this Court determines that 
U.CA. § 58-9-601 et. seq. should not apply to the present case, New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 
24-12A-2 must apply to the present case. Clearly New Mexico has the "most significant contacts" 
in the case at bar. 
Therefore, Petitioner' s preliminary injunction should be dismissed. Respondent also reserves 
the issue regarding attorneys fees for a later date. 
DATED this ¥4 rday of August, 2003. 
HUGHES AND BURSELL 
WILLIAM 0. KIMBALL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was placed in the United States 
mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the <-j&\ day of August, 
2003, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey C. Peatross 
Ranney and Peatross 
1722 East 280 North, #C-2 
St. Georee. UT 84770 
Terry Schramm 
Sexton of the St. George City Cemetery 
700 East Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
192 East 200 North 
Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
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MICHAEL D. HUGHES (1572) 
WILLIAM O KIMBALL (9460) 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




LESLIE DOZZO-OTERO, [SIC] DOZZO-
HUGHES MARTY GDLCREASE 
STROMAN, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
TERRY SCHRAMM, St. George Cemetery 
Sexton, and SOUTHWEST UTAH PUBLIC 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT, 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LESLIE DOZZO-
HUGHES 
Case No. 020502154 
Judge: James L. Schumate 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ) 
, :ss 
COUNTY OF ~ ^ B e y - A ^ iUb ) 
L Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says as follows: 
03 03:14p L. Dozzo Ph.D 5C5-323-9430 
Ay§> I 20UJ \ l 57PM HUGHES & BURSELL No h 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one. 
2. Petitioner and her family were try ing to force me to have Curtis buried in St. George, 
Utah. In fact, Cory Hughes was waiting at Frenches mortuary to try and persuade me regarding 
Curtis burial. 
3. I at no time released possession and control of Curtis to the Petitioner. I allowed the 
Mortuary service from St George, Utah to take Curtis, but I did not release control of Curtis to the 
Petitioner. In fact, I determined, without knowing the wishes of Cuitis, that he should be buried in 
S t George, Utah. 
4. Initially, I was only shown the first sentence of the note and a sentence or two near 
the end. Petitioner, then ripped the note out of my hands. I was not allowed to see the entire note 
until sometime in the Summer of 2002, and thus, I did not know the wishes of my deceased husband 
until that time. 
5. At no time did I waive my rightto determine the disposition of my deceased husband. 
I allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take Curtis to Utah and bury him, but I authorized all the actions that 
took place and never relinquished control over my deceased husband. 
6. I do not agree that by attending Curtis' burial in Utah that I was affirming anything. 
At the time of my attendance, I was not aware of Curtis' wish to be cremated. 
7. ThcPetitionerputabench on Curtis' grave sometime after the December 16-17,2002 
hearing. I was very upset after I saw the bench and realized that she put everyone's name on the 
bench except mine, I believe this was done to intentionally hurt me and somehow attempt to deny 
rtus- I . ZUU3 1 2 : 5 7 P W HUGHES & BL'RSELL N o - U 6 9 P - o 
my love for Curtis. 
8. Had the Petitioner and Curtis' family not lied to me, I would have been able to 
promptly honor Curtis' burial wishes. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this / day of August, 2003. 
STATE OF / \ | A £ ) ) l f c ^ / C c ) ) 
COUNTY QF~&fAftl»Clft ) 
__ day of August 2003, personally appeared before me Leslie Dozzo-Hughes 
U l U J u o : i t p i_ . u u ^ ^ u r n . u 
HJ6 I ZUUd ,Z b/HM HdGriES & BURSELL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true, and correct copy of the above and foregoing Affidavit of 
Leslie Dozzo-Hughes was placed in the United States mail, at St George, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid, on the ^[ day August, 2003 > addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey C. Peatross 
Ranney and Peatross 
1722 East 280 North, #C-2 
St. George, UT 84770 
Terry Schramm 
Sexton of the St. George City Cemetery 
700 East Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
192 East 200 North 
Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
JW..J- ^ H 
Exhibit "3" 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES (1572) 
WILLIAM 0. KIMBALL (9460) 
HUGHES & BURSELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-4892 
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LESLIE DOZZO-OTERO, [SIC] DOZZO-
HUGHES MARTY GILCREASE 
STROMAN, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
TERRY SCHRAMM, St. George Cemetary 
Sexton, and SOUTHWEST UTAH PUBLIC 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 020502154 
Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
COMES NOW, Leslie Dozzo-Hughes, by and through her attorneys of record Michael D. 
Hughes and William O. Kimball, of Hughes and Bursell, P.C, hereby file Respondent's Reply to 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment Statement of Facts. 
1. On February 12, 2002, Respondent received a voice mail messagefrom Curtis stating 
COPY 
"1 i , 
that he was going to kill himself and that he would like to he cremated and have his ashes spread 
over the Rio Grande. (Dozzo-Hughes Deposition p. 142, lines 6-13). 
Respondent disputes paragraph #3 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because Petitioner is 
stating a partial truth. Curtis did leave a voice mail message on February 12, 2002, but then called 
back Vi hour later and stated that he did not mean what he said. Furthermore, the Respondent 
thought that it was a ploy to get attention, as is common in her profession. (Deposition of Leslie 
Dozzo-Hughes p.143, lines 8-15). 
2. Respondent made the preparations for the service in Albuquerque and made the 
decision completely on her own, without the assistance of any of Curtis's family members, to release 
possession and control of Curtis's body to Petitioner by authorizing his body to be shipped to Utah 
for additional funeral services and burial in Utah. (Dozzo-Hughes Deposition p. 140, lines 23-25 
and p. 141, lines 1-7 and Affidavit ofDeanna Pugh). 
Respondent disputes #5 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because although she made the 
arrangements, Petitioner's family constantly pushed the Respondent and Cory Hughes was waiting 
at French's Mortuary and tried to intimidate the Respondent into releasing Curtis's body for burial 
in Utah. Furthermore, Respondent did not release possession and control of the body to Petitioner. 
Petitioner allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take the body to Utah, but she did not release the body to 
Petitioner in any manner, contrary to Petitioner's baseless assertions. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-
Hughes paragraph 2). 
2 
3. Petitioner read for the first time the note left to her by her son on March 6, 2002. 
(Deanna Pugh Deposition p. 22, lines 5-21). 
Respondent disputes paragraph #7 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because Petitioner was 
very nervous that the Respondent would want to cremate Curtis. This fear was stimulated by the 
Petitioner's knowledge of the contents of the note. (See hearing transcript for December 16-17). 
4. Petitioner showed Respondent the note Curtis left Petitioner, immediately after 
reading it for the first time, on March 6, 2003. (Dozzo-Hughes Deposition p. 121, 1-10). 
Respondent disputes paragraph #8 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts because Petitioner only 
showed the Respondent part of the note. Respondent was not allowed to see the entire note until 
sometime in the Summer of 2002, and thus, did not know the wishes of her deceased husband until 
after the burial. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 4; Judge Shumate's May 19, 2003 
Ruling). 
5. Petitioner hired MetcalfMortuary to obtain possession and control of Curtis's body 
from Albuquerque for a funeral service and interment in the burial plot in St. George, Utah. 
Petitioner paid for all expenses incurred for the shipment of Curtis's body, funeral and burial in St. 
George, Utah. (Affidavit of Deanna Pugh). 
Respondent disputes paragraph #9 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts regarding the 
connotation that Respondent waived her rights to the body of her deceased husband. Respondent 
allowed Metcalf Mortuary to take her husband to Utah and bury him. Petitioner may have paid the 
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mortuary, but the Respondent never relinquished control of her husband to Petitioner. (Affidavit of 
Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 5). 
6. On March 8, 2002, Respondent affirmed the burial by attending the funeral service, 
the burial in Washington County, Utah 
Respondent refutes paragraph #10 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts. Respondent did not 
affirm the burial by attending the funeral service. Respondent was not aware of Curtis' wish to be 
cremated at this point and in no way affirmed the burial, particularly absent the knowledge of her 
deceased husband's directive. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes paragraph 6; Judge Shumate's 
May 19, 2003 Ruling). 
7. Petitioner purchased the stone and bench placed upon the grave of her son. 
(Affidavit ofDeanna Pugh). 
Respondent refutes paragraph #11 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts as not applicable to the 
present case. The stone and bench placed upon the grave was not placed on the grave until after the 
December 16 and 17 hearing. Furthermore, to hurt the Respondent, Petitioner conspicuously left 
Respondent's name off the memorial portion of the bench. (Affidavit of Leslie Dozzo-Hughes 
paragraph 7). 
8. Petitioner has burial rights to three plots next to her son for her burial and Her 
husband's burial (Deanna Pugh Deposition p. 29, lines 19-24). 
Respondent refutes paragraph #12 of Petitioner's Statement ofFacts as far as no actual proof 
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exists relating to this paragraph. Petitioner stated at her deposition that she did not own the land that 
Curtis was buried on. (Deanna Pugh Deposition p. 30, lines 2-9). 
9. Respondent at no time from the death of Curtis to the burial ten days later indicated 
to Petitioner or any members of Petitioner's family that her decision to allow Petitioner to bury 
Curtis in St. George, Utah, was in any way temporary. (Affidavit Deanna Pugh.). 
Respondent refutes paragraph #13 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts as unsubstantiated by 
the Affidavit of Deanna Pugh. Deanna Pugh cannot testify regarding the knowledge of the other 
family members. Furthermore, had Curtis' family not lied to the Respondent, she would not need 
to pursue the present action to honor her deceased husband's wishes. 
10. Petitioner specifically disputes Respondent's paragraph #4 in her statement of facts. 
Respondent clearly knew of Decedent's alleged wish to be cremated before his death. See # 3 above. 
Respondent refutes paragraph #14 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts by referring this Court 
to Judge Shumate's Ruling dated May 19, 2003, which states "[s]ometime following the burial, 
Respondent became aware of Mr. Hughes' desire to be cremated and have his ashes scattered from 
a bridge spanning the Rio Grande River." (Judge Shumate's May 19, 2003 Ruling). 
DATED this IV day of September, 2003. 
HUGHES & BURSELL 
WILLIAM O. KIMBALL 
MICHAEL D.HUGHES 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a fall, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS was placed in th&United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-
class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the ^ Z^aay of September, 2003, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey C. Peatross 
Ranney and Peatross 
1722 East 280 North, #C-2 
St. George, UT 84770 
Terry Schramm 
Sexton of the St. George City Cemetery 
700 East Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
192 East 200 North 
Suite 200 
St. George, UT 84770 
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